Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s Famous Letter to the French Leader During the Cold War, Strongly Pressuring Premier Mendes-France to Agree to Western European Defense Measures and Setting Out a New Postwar Order

With France or without her: “I, myself, am very much opposed to the withdrawal of all American and British troops from the continent. You may count on me to oppose to the best of my ability the strategic conception known as “peripheral”. On the other hand I should feel bound, whether as Prime Minister or as a Private Member, to support the policy known as “The Empty Chair”, although this would involve large changes in the infra-structure of NATO…I feel that the United States with their immense superiority of nuclear weapons and acting in association with Great Britain, the British Commonwealth and the German Federal Republic, will be strong enough… to afford to the Benelux countries and our other Allies for whom we have a deep regard, and also the German Federal Republic to whom we are bound in honour, a definite and substantial security based on physical and moral deterrent power.”

A rare private and personal letter of Churchill to a fellow head of state, giving a detailed if not unique look at how Churchill conducted his diplomacy. Of particular note is his use of the term “empty chair” to symbolize Britain going forward even if France does not (symbolized as an empty chair)

 

With the Cold War on, the distrust between the Eastern Bloc (led by the Soviet Union) and Western Bloc (led by the United States and Great Britain) was at its height. It became clear in the West that a plan to guard against Soviet incursions was of the utmost importance. In 1952, an attempt to deal with the problem was made when the European Defense Community (EDC) was set up in Paris, an effort by Western European powers, with American support, to counterbalance the overwhelming conventional military ascendancy of the Soviets in Europe by the formation of a supranational European army and, in the process, to subsume West German forces into a European force, thus avoiding the thorny problem of West German rearmament. A treaty was actually concluded in Paris in 1952, under the terms of which the three Western powers agreed to terminate the occupation regime and recognize the Federal Republic as a sovereign state. The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would accede to the Brussels Treaty establishing the Western Union. But although numerous nations in Europe signed in the coming months, in August 1954 the French National Assembly would decide against ratification. Italy also failed to ratify.

While the struggle over ratification continued, the Berlin Conference of 1954 was held. It was a meeting of the “Big Four” foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The ministers agreed to call a wider international conference to discuss a settlement to the recent Korean War and the ongoing Indochina War between France and the Viet Minh in Vietnam, but it failed to reach agreement on issues of European security, German reunification, and perhaps the most important one – the international status of Germany, then under four-power occupation after World War II.

The sensitive issue of Germany and its capital, Berlin, continued to divide East and West in late 1954. In October, nearly ten years after the cessation of hostilities, and with no early prospect of agreement with the USSR on a final peace settlement, the NATO allies regularized their relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.

With the European Defense Community of 1952 unratified, a meeting was held in London in late 1954 of the Conference of Nine, to seek an alternative to the EDC. Participating countries were Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Britain and United States. October 1954 saw some additional signatures to the Paris Agreement, the Federal Republic of Germany was invited to join NATO, and Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany acceded to the Western European Union. But France delayed ratification of this latter agreement, too.

Winston Churchill was in his last months as Prime Minister, and Pierre Mendes-France, French Premier, was also soon to leave office. Churchill was displeased by the French position, and he warned the French government that the United States and Britain could and would defend West Europe without France if necessary. The French, instead of acceding to the Paris Accords, proposed to suggest to Moscow the holding of a four-power conference in May to resolve remaining issues. Churchill distrusted the Soviets and rejected that proposal. He opposed both a conference and an invitation to a conference until all the signatories had ratified the Paris agreements which would arm West Germany within the Atlantic alliance. He added that this also was the unalterable attitude of the United States.

The French Premier wrote Churchill on January 5, 1955, saying he still lacked final support for the treaty in his country, and again suggesting a conference that would include the Soviets. “My Dear Prime Minister: As I had believed myself able to assure you in the course of our conversations in London, the National Assembly has approved the accords on which depend the unity and the cohesion of the Western powers. But, as I predicted to you, the debate has been difficult. I am persuaded that we would not have had a positive vote if we had not been able to cite the engagement of your Government to maintain important forces on the Continent. lf the difficulties have not yet been overcome. I must obtain a vote from the Council of the Republic. It is important above all that French public opinion remain convinced that the agreements are necessary and that their adoption and their execution will not prevent the Western powers from pursuing with resolution and perseverance a policy of peace.

“The demonstration of the good will of the West should be incessant. If these attempts, for which you have so often given an example, succeed, it would be for the benefit of the entire world. If, by misfortune, they fail, we will have at least given proof to the eyes of the people that their Governments have done their duty and we will have cemented again, if that be necessary, the association of the nations of the free world. I believe that such is indeed also your thought. It is in this spirit that has been drafted the following note, which I submit for your appraisal and which I am also sending to President Eisenhower, as well as to Sir Anthony Eden and to Mr. Foster Dulles. This note suggests two possible procedures for proposing to the Soviet Union a four-power conference which might be called for a date in the near future, in the month of May, for example, on condition that it be carefully prepared through diplomatic channels…”

In an attached note, he added detailed proposals:

“1. The proposals which I made at the rostrum of the United Nations contributed to the support of the arguments which I developed in the course of the recent debates in the National Assembly and have helped very much to influence the vote of a certain number of deputies in favor of the accords of Paris. Orators of diverse tendencies asked the Government to prepare, through diplomatic negotiations undertaken immediately, a new four-power conference. In these conditions, the French Government cannot remain inactive.

2. It believes it necessary that a new proposal be made to the Russian Government, and this as soon as possible. Two procedures can be envisaged: (A) In the first hypothesis, the French Government could take the opportunity furnished to it by the Soviet note relative to the threat to denounce the French-Soviet treaty, a note which cannot in any case remain without answer. The French Government could, after having refuted the argument of the Moscow government on the pretended aggressive character of the Paris accords, conclude in renewing its offer of diplomatic negotiations to prepare a four-power conference for the month of May, it being understood that by that by that date France will have ratified the accords of Paris. The terms of the proposal that would thus be made to the Soviet Union would be communicated beforehand to the United States and British Governments, and this fact would be mentioned in the communication of the French government to the Soviet government. (B) Another formula, which naturally has the preference of the French government, would consist in submitting to the Soviet government the offer of a four-power conference through a common note of the three Allied governments. This note could be drafted according to the procedure that has been followed up to now for the writing of Western notes addressed to the Soviet Union, on the condition, however, that this does not cause a troublesome delay.

3. In insisting on the importance, in its view, of the step which it proposes, the French government is convinced that it is only at the price of an incessant initiative in favor of an international understanding that the Western powers will succeed in preserving the indispensable support of their public opinion for their policy: The risks that passivity in this domain would imply would be great not only in France, but equally so in Germany, as shown by the last debate in the Bundestag. By contrast. the Soviet Union through declarations without any real basis, could take the lead, win the benefit of initiative and appear to be the only one anxious to reach of the questions in suspense.

4. The French government would be happy to know as rapidly as possible the view of the British government on the suggestions above.”

Churchill responded. Typed letter signed on his Prime Minister’s letterhead, London, January 12, 1955, to Mendes-France, rejecting his proposals and rather ominously saying that Britain and the United States would defend Western Europe, with or without French cooperation and participation. “Thank you very much for your letter. I renew my congratulations to you on your success in the Chamber. I feel that your difficulties in dealing with all the vehement and self-centered groups must be enormous. Your courage and vitality have given me an impression of French leadership which I had not sustained since the days of Clemenceau. Pray accept my earnest compliments.

“I have for some time felt a strong desire to establish a direct personal contact with the new leaders of the Soviet government such as might lead to a fruitful Four-Power Conference. But these thoughts of mine received a rude check when the Soviets requested a Four Power meeting of the Foreign Secretaries, apparently, with the object of stimulating opposition in the French chamber of the ratification of E.D.C. After this came the London Conference and Sir Anthony Eden’s initiative was there, and subsequently at Paris, crowned by the Agreements which you by your determination and skill managed, though by a very small majority, to pass through the Chamber. I am well aware that the Treaty has also to pass the Conseil de la République and of the many opportunities for uncertainty and delay which still remain.

“I still hold most strongly to my conviction that a Top Level Meeting might be productive of real advantages if the time and circumstances were well chosen. This view was, as you know, expressed in a unanimous resolution by the House of Commons last year. I cannot feel, however, that at this juncture any negotiation with the Soviets about a Four Power meeting even though conditional on the agreements having been previously ratified, would help our common cause. Weakness makes no appeal to the Soviets. To mix up the process of ratification with what might well follow soon afterwards would very likely dilute both Firmness and Conciliation. The sooner we can get our united ratification the sooner the Top-Level Four-Power Conference may come.

“Although we have every sympathy with you in your difficulties and admiration for your exertions, the fact should be accepted that I and my colleagues are wholeheartedly resolved that there shall be no meeting or invitation in any circumstances which we can foresee between the Four Powers, either on the Foreign Secretaries level or on that of the Heads of Governments, until the London-Paris Agreements have been ratified by all the signatories. In this we are in the closest accord with the United States. I cannot believe there is the slightest chance of any change of attitude on this point in either of our two countries. Indeed I fear that an indefinite process of delay may well lead to the adoption of other solutions which are certainly being studied on both sides of the Atlantic.

“I, myself, am very much opposed to the withdrawal of all American and British troops from the continent. You may count on me to oppose to the best of my ability the strategic conception known as “peripheral”. On the other hand I should feel bound, whether as Prime Minister or as a Private Member, to support the policy known as “The Empty Chair”, although this would involve large changes in the infra-structure of NATO, both military and political. I feel that the United States with their immense superiority of nuclear weapons and acting in association with Great Britain, the British Commonwealth and the German Federal Republic, will be strong enough, at any rate during the next few years, to afford to the Benelux countries and our other Allies for whom we have a deep regard, and also the German Federal Republic to whom we are bound in honour, a definite and substantial security based on physical and moral deterrent power. In this breathing space much may be achieved.

“But having ever since 1910 worked and fought with and for France, for whose people I have a deep affection, I should feel the utmost sorrow to see her isolated and losing her influence with the rest of the free world. I hope indeed that it will fall to you to save your country from this evil turn of fortune….”

This is a rare Churchill letter of state, one in which he takes very strong positions and makes important decisions that helped define the Cold War. It is also a detailed if not unique look at how Churchill conducted his diplomacy. Of particular note is his use of the term “empty chair” to symbolize Britain going forward even if France does not (symbolized as an empty chair).