Sold – Lincoln Urgently Writes His Chief Man in Pennsylvania, Trying to Win That Crucial Battleground State in the 1860 Election
Scarce letter of Lincoln showing him personally directing the most famous campaign in American history at its most crucial place and time .
Lincoln and the Republicans saw Pennsylvania as absolutely essential in winning the election of 1860. They had failed to win that state in 1856, but this time it was a divided and hotly contested battleground that would be a bellwether for the efforts elsewhere. Of added importance was the state’s gubernatorial elections in...
Lincoln and the Republicans saw Pennsylvania as absolutely essential in winning the election of 1860. They had failed to win that state in 1856, but this time it was a divided and hotly contested battleground that would be a bellwether for the efforts elsewhere. Of added importance was the state’s gubernatorial elections in October, a month before Lincoln’s name was on the national ballot. The contest in October would test the Republican message and could, hopefully, gather momentum for the Republican presidential nominee. Party leaders knew this. The major Republican power broker in Pennsylvania, Alexander McClure, went so far as to go Chicago to the Republican National Convention to prevent the nomination of Governor Seward of New York, thinking his name and standing as a prominent liberal would doom the gubernatorial candidate, Andrew Curtain, in more conservative Pennsylvania. The state cast its first ballot vote for favorite son Senator Cameron. But McClure was successful. The second ballot went not to Bates or Seward but to Lincoln. Speculation as to a promise to Cameron for a cabinet post began here. Surely, the importance of the state might have justified such a thing. And McClure was in the middle. As Lincoln Historian Reinhard H. Luthin notes: “Curtin’s lieutenant, Alexander K. McClure, a participant in the midnight caucus that swung Pennsylvania to Lincoln, insisted that the shift to Lincoln was made before the promise of a Cabinet post to Cameron. Later McClure declared that as soon as the Pennsylvania delegation had decided to support Lincoln, one of Cameron’s confidential advisers, John P. Sanderson… secured this promise in behalf of his chief from them.” The casting of Pennsylvania’s vote for Lincoln on the second ballot was one of the facts that contributed most toward Lincoln’s nomination.
Likewise, Pennsylvania’s October state elections were based on national issues, and here Lincoln must win. McClure effectively led that state’s party; he was Lincoln’s Pennsylvania man on the inside. McClure later recalled: “It was believed on all sides that unless Pennsylvania could be carried in October, Lincoln’s defeat would be certain in November. Pennsylvania was thus accepted as the key to Republican success, and Lincoln naturally watched the struggle with intense interest. In accordance with his repeated solicitations, he was advised from the headquarters of the State Committee, of which I was chairman, of all the varied phases of the struggle. It soon became evident from his inquiries and versatile suggestions that he took nothing for granted. He had to win the preliminary battle in October, and he left nothing undone within his power to ascertain the exact situation and to understand every peril involved in it.”
Following precedent set by George Washington and every Presidential candidate since, Lincoln did no overt campaigning himself, leaving the public politicking, rallies, speeches, and editorializing, to trusted supporters. But behind the scenes, Lincoln worked unstintingly to secure his election, closely monitoring reports from across the nation, planning strategies, and marshaling supporters. Pennsylvania is perhaps the most famous example of this work, and there is a reason for this. He needed the state. The correspondence between Lincoln and McClure is perhaps the most significant example of Lincoln’s work in winning the nomination, without leaving Springfield.
Lincoln faced 3 opponents in the general election: John C. Breckenridege and John Bell would essentially divide the South; and Stephen A. Douglas would carry the banner for the Democratic Party in the North and swing states. Together, they would split the anti-Republican vote. This splintered opposition was an asset for Lincoln. In September, just a month before the October local elections that so often greatly influenced the national election in November, Lincoln received an anonymous note, dated September 2, 1860, from a New York informant, reporting that some 80 of the most prominent members of “the combined opposition parties” met in New York City and were told by Robert Walker, a Democrat and former Governor of the Kansas Territory, that they had no chance of winning New York. Walker urged those present to concentrate their efforts on Pennsylvania and New Jersey instead, and a large sum of money was apparently raised for that purpose at the meeting. According to Lincoln’s informant, much of that money had just been turned over to William Bigler, a Democratic Senator from Pennsylvania, for use in his state for both the October and November elections.
Lincoln wrote McClure immediately with this disturbing, secret information, and indeed sending a copy of the letter itself.
Autograph Letter Signed, Springfield, September 6, 1860, to McClure. “Inclosed I send you a copy of a letter from New-York, stating a matter which, if true, deeply concerns our interests in Pennsylvania. The writer does not wish to be known; but some revelations of his in a former letter have subsequently been verified.” The letter is published in Basler. Included is a reproduction of the letter Lincoln enclosed to McClure. The secretive informant has never been identified, adding some mystery.
As his biographer noted, McClure saw his role in not only swinging the state to Lincoln and gaining votes, but keeping Lincoln informed and up to date. He replied to Lincoln on September 12, assuring him that he was well aware of the opposition’s effort. Indeed, he had heard of it directly from Governor Walker, who was then visiting in Philadelphia. But McClure expressed confidence that the Republicans could carry Pennsylvania, in October as well as November, provided they continued their efforts to organize throughout the state and get out the vote. As it turns out, although a meeting of “substantial men” had been held in New York to try to raise money to use against the Republicans in Pennsylvania, the effort had failed. The money had not been raised. Lincoln went on to win Pennsylvania by a surprising 60,000 votes, nearly doubling Curtain’s victory of 32,000. He won all but 7 of the 25 seats in Congress. And McClure was rewarded with the chairmanship of the Republican State Committee and the Federal post of Assistant Adjutant General. McClure’s service to Lincoln was not done, however. In January 1861 while Lincoln was building his Team of Rivals, he called McClure to Springfield to consult with him on his nomination of Simon Cameron for a cabinet post. Based on McClure’s input that nomination was postponed until Pennsylvania Republicans could be lined up behind Cameron.
This is one of a tiny handful of letters we can ever recall seeing showing him directing his 1860 campaign.
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