General Dwight D. Eisenhower Threatens the French With Suspension of the American Program to Re-arm Them If They Remain Uncooperative in Assisting American Forces Invading Europe

Ike’s threat, subtle but clear: “I request that you inform the [French] Committee of National Liberation of the above, and request that their assurance be given as a matter of urgency in order that there may be no delay or interference in our common war effort and in the development of an army which, it is our hope, will participate in the liberation of France.”

Henri Giraud commanded the French 9th Army during the Battle of France and was taken prisoner on May 18, 1940. He escaped confinement in Konigstein, Germany in April 1942 and made his way to Vichy. He supported Petain’s National Revolution but refused to collaborate with the Germans. Giraud escaped and was picked up by a British submarine and taken to Gibraltar on the eve of the Allied landings in North Africa. The Americans, who were put off by Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French, were anxious to find an alternative to him and planned to install Giraud as governor and commander of French military forces. Though the British, who knew De Gaulle was popular in France, were more circumspect about him than the Americans, the Allies bestowed the title of Civil and Military Governor of French North and West Africa on Giraud. The Free French refused to accept the imposition. De Gaulle and Giraud were summoned to Casablanca for the conference in January 1943.

The Casablanca Conference was held at the Anfa Hotel in Casablanca in French Morocco from January 14 to 24, 1943, to plan the Allied European strategy for the next phase of World War II. In attendance were President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Also attending were the sovereign of Morocco Sultan, and representing the French, both Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henry Giraud. There Roosevelt insisted the French reach an accommodation or lose American support. Roosevelt and Churchill effected a public rapprochement between Giraud, who was effectively the French Military and Civil Commander in Chief, and de Gaulle, but the two men remained at odds.

On February 6, 1943, Lt. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was named commander of the Allied armies in the African theater of operations (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco), based on a decision made by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca. Previously, Eisenhower’s command was limited to U.S. forces in North Africa. Early in the morning on February 19, the Germans struck Allied forces, and over the next week or so, inflicted heavy punishment upon them. Besides contending with the military situation, Eisenhower and President Roosevelt were dealing with another key issue, one with both military and foreign policy implications, and which could affect the course of the war and beyond: how to rearm Free French forces, allow them to participate in the North African campaign and beyond, and get them to effectively cooperate with other Allied forces.

When General Giraud estimated that there were enough French officers and noncommissioned officers in North Africa to raise an army of 250,000, the President took the position that the French leader should be instructed to go ahead and that the British and Americans should make every effort to provide the necessary equipment. The upshot of the negotiations at Casablanca was an Allied understanding that a program to equip the French Army should be started immediately. In a February 23, 1943, letter to Giraud, Eisenhower first stressed the United States Government’s desire and policy to equip the French forces properly as fast as shipping be allocated for that purpose. The principle of a rearmament had been recognized by the American government and made the subject of an explicit statement Eisenhower had made on behalf of the U.S. government.

In May 1943, de Gaulle was fighting for pre-eminence among the expatriate French factions based in North Africa, and the Americans were backing another general, Henri Giraud. On June 3, 1943, the French Committee of National Liberation accepted an arrangement under which generals Giraud and de Gaulle would serve as co-presidents. Two weeks later, General Eisenhower, for the purpose of coordinating military operations with the French Army based in North Africa, met with both generals on and insisted that the control of the French forces remain in the hands of Giraud. Although Eisenhower tried to deliver this message gently, his point angered General de Gaulle, who viewed Eisenhower’s demand as a breach of French sovereignty. By autumn, de Gaulle had won the power struggle for leadership of the Free French movement, but the Americans and British were not resigned to the result.

De Gaulle made an attempt to reassure the Allies that he could be trusted by winning some credit with Eisenhower. The two men met at the end of 1943 to sort out a serious difficulty that had blown up over the deployment of French forces in Italy. In November, a French Expeditionary Force of two French divisions had been sent to Italy to join the American Fifth Army. This French force, formed out of the regular French army in North Africa, had been armed by the Americans. It gave the French their first opportunity to play a serious role in the war. The next French division to go to Italy was assumed to be one of the original Free French divisions commanded by Diego Brosset, but since his unit had been equipped by the British it was difficult to integrate into an American army. Giraud had done nothing to re-equip it with American matériel because he did not want to divert resources from what he saw as ‘his’ and not de Gaulle’s divisions. When the American high command refused to accept the Brosset division as is, Giraud offered another division of the regular army, the 9th Colonial, one supported by Eisenhower. But De Gaulle overruled this decision. This was not merely a skirmish against Giraud: it would have been a terrible blow to the morale of the Free French officers to be excluded from the fighting in Italy. Giraud was forced out of the co-presidency in November 1943. Eisenhower in turn overruled de Gaulle and threatened to suspend the entire French rearmament program. All the ingredients of a major crisis were in place.

In mid-December Giraud wrote Eisenhower confirming French refusal to send the 9th Colonial, and Eisenhower responded expressing concern at the decision. Eisenhower notes that Giraud had originally proposed the 1st Motorized Infantry Division under General Diego Brosset, but that since they were equipped with British equipment, it would be overly cumbersome to create useful supply lines.

Typed letter signed, on his Allied Force Headquarters letterhead, marked Secret, December 14, 1943, to Giraud, being the very letter threatening to suspend the arming of the French. “My dear General, Your letter of the 11th of December, 1943, informs me that the Committee of National Defense has refused to send to Italy the 9th Colonial Infantry Division which you nominated for service when technical difficulties precluded the use of the division you first selected,

“When you first proposed the 1st Motorized Infantry Division as the third division of the French Corps operating in Italy, I informed you that I would be particularly delighted to accept this division if it were armed with American equipment because of its proven battle efficiency. Since, however, the division is armed with British equipment, the supply difficulties that would result if it were sent to Italy as part of an otherwise American equipped corps, were insurmountable. As it was found impracticable in the time available to re-equip and train the 1st Motorized Infantry Division with American equipment, I agreed to your nomination of the 9th Colonial Infantry Division as replacement, and our plans were made accordingly. The decision of the Committee of National Defense upsets these plans for the relief of American units now engaged in battle, and, from the tactical point of view, entails grave consequences.

“Certain units of the French army are now being re-equipped by the United States in accordance with agreements which you concluded personally with President Roosevelt at the ANFA Conference and in Washington, It was understood that the French forces thus re-armed would be employed, under my direction, as might be required in the war against our common enemy, This is the purpose of the rearmament program. In view of the action of the Committee of National Defense you will, I am sure, understand that the rearmament program for the French forces cannot be continued unless there is definite assurance from the Committee of National Liberation that the use of these forces when re-equipped will be governed solely by military considerations and subject to the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff through their representative, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in this theater.

“I request that you inform the Committee of National Liberation of the above, and request that their assurance be given as a matter of urgency in order that there may be no delay or interference in our common war effort and in the development of an army which, it is our hope, will participate in the liberation of France.”