Sold – Napoleon’s Original Orders For the Reorganization of the Grand Army

The French Army of the period 1800-1812 may have been the finest ever assembled on the European continent since the Romans 1600 years before. The disastrous campaign in Russia in 1812 swallowed up the majority of its veteran troops, however, and afterwards the reconstruction of the line infantry became necessary.

Napoleon did an extraordinary job filling depleted units and adding new ones. In 1813, as part of this process, he made one regiment out of a portion of the Municipal Guard of Paris, more than twenty new line regiments from cohorts of the National Guard, and used four artillery regiments from the Navy as infantry. To these new units, battalion numbers from 134 through 156 were given. This new army was sizeable but lacking in training and discipline as many of the men were recruits recently enlisted.

The French Army was organized by battalions and regiments. From 1808-1813, there were four battalions in a regiment, three of which were field battalions and one a supply unit. This was similar in concept to the U.S. Army, except that in America the term regiment was used for what the French called battalion and the term brigade was used for what the French called regiment. This formation worked well for the French, but 1813 would see its demise.

Following the campaign in Russia and defeats in the Peninsular War, the anti-French forces regrouped as the Sixth Coalition, comprising Britain, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Prussia, Austria, Sweden and certain German states. Napoleon was then forced to defend his hold on Germany, crossing the Elbe in late September 1813 and organizing his forces around Leipzig to protect his supply lines and confront the Coalition. The result was the Battle of Leipzig (October 16-19, 1813), also called the Battle of the Nations, the largest conflict in the Napoleonic Wars. There just under 200,000 French and allied troops faced 400,000 Coalition forces. Napoleon was outnumbered and had to spread his forces thin because the enemy approached from different directions, and as a consequence suffered his most decisive defeat, losing some 70,000 men – more than a third of his army.

After the battle, Napoleon withdrew in the direction of Mayence (Mainz). He beat a German force at Hanau on October 31 but lost another 9,000 men. On November 2, 1813, the once-grand French Army crossed the Rhine and headed west towards Paris with Coalition forces not far behind. In a little over a year, Napoleon had lost some 400,000 men and all of Europe was now closing in on him. He would need to reorganize his army for a last stand. The loss of Holland on November 16 underlined the urgency of this.

Letter Signed, two pages, November 18, 1813, Court at St. Cloud, to Henri Jacques Clarke, Duc de Feltre, his Minister of War, communicating the measures he wanted taken to reorganize his remaining forces and ordering that they be made official by the War Ministry. “By my order of the 7th of November, I have removed the 3rd battalion from 16 Regiments – the 135th, 139th, 140th, 141st, 149th, 150th, 152nd, 153rd, 154th, 155th, 156th, 136th, 142nd, 144th and 145th. These regiments will only be composed therefore of two battalions of war and one of supply. Along with the 137th and the 151st that are in Glogau, that will make up all the regiments formed from cohorts. All the others are taken away. I have equally withdrawn the 6th battalion from the 5th line, the 6th battalion from the 13th line (but these two batallions need to retire to Italy), the 6th battalion from the 23rd line, the 3rd and the 4th battalions from the 37th line…I have also diminished all the battalions of the navy equalizing them at 4 battalions per regiment with one battalion of supply. It will be necessary that all of these dispositions be regularized [made official] by a decree, but we must proceed carefully and only present it when we will have stopped the situation with the cadres in Marmes. My ordinance officer Gourgault should have given you copies of the work that I signed at Mayence the 7th…”

So in this, Napoleon’s original order to reorganize his Grand Army for a last stand at Paris, he instructs his Minister of War to slice a field battalion from each regiment, a drastic measure reflecting a recognition that he could not again fill the vacancies occasioned by his losses. The defeats had hit the morale of the French Army hard, and news of these sweeping changes would be difficult for many veterans to take, as well as indicate to many soldiers that the war was essentially lost. His reference to a situation that needed to be resolved in the town of Marmes, France before this crucial order could be exposed to the army is quite significant, in that it implies that units stationed there were openly dissatisfied if not in revolt, and that Napoleon believed that promulgation of the order immediately would inflame and perhaps spread the problem. Perhaps that is also why although Napoleon decided upon these measures on November 7, until this letter eleven days later neither he nor his staff members had communicated the details, even to his secretary of war.