In a Letter to Meade, Gen. Grant Acts Firmly to Foil Lee’s Opportunity to Press His Advantage After the Confederate Victory at Ream’s Station

I think it is advisable to get all our forces back on the line we now hold and strengthen it well."

Petersburg is just 25 miles south of Richmond, and much of the Confederate capital's supplies came from there. Petersburg was fed by three rail lines: the Norfolk & Petersburg Railroad that ran from Petersburg southeast, the Petersburg & Weldon that ran south, and the South Side that ran in a westerly direction. If Grant could cut all three rail lines, the Confederates would have to evacuate Richmond. After the battle for the Weldon was won by Grant forces on August 21, 1864, both the Norfolk & Petersburg and Petersburg and Weldon were in Union hands. To make retaking the Weldon Railroad pointless to the Confederates, Grant wanted its track torn up for 14 miles south of the cut his troops had just made at Globe Tavern, hoping eventually to destroy the railroad as far south as Emporia, Va., forty miles below Petersburg. He also wanted his siege lines extended to cover the recently gained ground, so that a Confederate attack would find him already entrenched.

The Warren's 5th Corps was assigned to extend the trenches from Globe Tavern, while Winfield S. Hancock's 2nd Corps was ordered to tear up track south of that point. On August 23 some of Hancock's men were engaged in that task, while others occupied nearby Ream's Station. Hancock got there himself the next day, and he had 8,500 men.

This movement created a logistical nightmare for Lee. Dinwiddie Court House is due west of Ream's Station, and it was smack on the Confederate's escape route from Petersburg. It was crucial that the Confederates hold it, as if that escape route was closed, both Petersburg and Richmond would have to be evacuated for a safer spot. Having Union troops entrenched at Ream's Station threatened Dinwiddie, and this was a threat he could not tolerate. Moreover, after losing the Weldon Railroad, Lee was looking for a significant victory. He determined to eject Hancock's men from Ream's Station and sent a strong force of some 13,000 men, including elements of A.P. Hill's Corps and Wade Hampton's cavalry, to attack that place on the 25th, which they did. Gen. George G. Meade, in operational command of the Army of the Potomac because Grant was ill, was with the 5th Corps watching it tear up railroad tracks when he was informed of the attack. He did not go right to the front to observe the situation and issue orders in person, as Grant likely would have done. Instead, communicating via messenger, Meade told Hancock to hold the line, and promised to send reinforcements. But fearing that the Confederates might try to attack between Ream's Station and Globe Tavern, he sent troops to every point he thought was exposed if that were to happen. But as he wrote Grant, although he sent a division to "watch Hancock's rear & move up to his support if necessary," none were actually sent to Ream's Station.

The initial Confederate attack at Ream's Station was repulsed, and Hancock even launched a counterattack, which however was thrown back. Then at 5:00 in the afternoon, Confederate troops, emerging from the woods in front of the Union works, advanced on them in two lines of battle. They gained the outside of the Union entrenchments, and at some points a hand to hand conflict ensued over the top of the breastworks, with Hancock's men beating back the rebels with their bayonets, as they attempted to climb over. But soon the Union line was broken near the center, and that gap rapidly grew wider, until nearly the entire line was swept back.  The Confederates now held the Union trenches. Union General Nelson Miles, with great coolness, set to work to rally his men, and in a short time succeeded in forming a line with its right resting against the breastworks. At the same time Hancock ordered the Second Division to be faced about, and cheering and urging the men forward, led them in person in a charge at double-quick. But the ground they retook could not be held and was lost. The battle was a Union debacle, and Union units were in disarray. The amount of unguarded Union prisoners sent behind Confederate lines was so great that the Confederate command momentarily believed, due to the smoke and confusion, that their attack was a failure and that those were their men coming back. At evening the Union generals discussed whether to try to retake the entrenchments but determined that this would not be possible.

Grant now saw he had troops scattered at a number of places down the line from Globe Tavern to Ream's Station, with uncertainty about what would happen next. He considered it unwise to stretch his force thin this way, and disliked the chaotic nature of the situation, believing these exposed his force and created opportunities for Lee to attack. So rather than shuffle troops or order counterstrikes, Grant determined on a move to end the chaos, reassert control, and preclude Lee's making use of this moment to inflict a really serious defeat. And whether still ill or not, he also wanted to reassume his operational control over the Army of the Potomac.

His solution was to recall all the Union forces back to their main lines, ending the exposure and securing the situation. When that was done, he could consider launching more operations. This is his original letter to Meade ordering the implementation of this plan. Autograph Letter Signed, City Point, August 25, 1864, to Meade. “I think it is advisable to get all our forces back on the line we now hold and strengthen it well.  When that is done we can detach fifteen or twenty thousand men and start them early in the morning so as to make a march of twenty miles and destroy the road at that distance.  We may be able at the same time to send the Army Gun boats up the Chowan with a detachment of troops to destroy the triangle of roads between Nottoway & Roanoke.”

The Chowan River is formed by the merging of Virginia's Blackwater and Nottoway rivers near the state line between Virginia and North Carolina, and flows into Abemarle Sound; and the Roanoke is a river that flows into the sound nearby. As part of the Union plan to destroy the Weldon Railroad, Union ships sailed up the Chowan, bombarding small Confederate posts near that railroad.

The Union forces withdrew to the main Union line near the Jerusalem Plank Road. Despite Grant's statement about launching another major operation soon (which was likely a face-saving gesture to Meade), it was about a month before that indeed took place. As for Lee, he had secured Dinwiddie, kept the lower part of the Weldon Railroad intact, and inflicted a small setback on Grant. However, the railroad remained cut and that cut firmly in Union hands. So in the end, thanks to Grant's snatching away Lee's opportunity, the Confederates could take little advantage of their victory.

We obtained this letter from the descendent of a member of General Grant’s staff. It was sent as a telegram, with the officer acting as a courier from Grant himself to the telegraph office. After seeing the telegram sent, he retained the original letter, and it has remained in his family for the ensuing 148 years. Knowledge of its text was known from copies, but the continued existence of the original has been unknown until now. It has never before been offered for sale.