President Polk Wants to Immediately Notify Congress of General Zachary Taylor’s Reports on the First Victories of the Mexican War

In a rare war-date letter to his Secretary of War, he seeks an additional copy of the reports made so that he can notify both Congressional chambers that very day   

On May 29, 1844, James K. Polk became the first dark horse presidential nominee of a major party. He received the nod of the Democrats when, at their national convention, the major candidates (Martin van Buren, Lewis Cass and James Buchanan) were in a stalemate and a compromise acceptable to all was sought. Polk ran on a nationalist platform of territorial expansion – what would soon be called Manifest Destiny – including the annexation of Texas and the demand for the acquisition of the entire Oregon Territory.

When Polk took office in March 1845, Texas was already in the process of annexation. His main goal became, by hook or by crook, to obtain from Mexico its northern lands (including not just Texas but New Mexico, Arizona and California). The new President was an intense, focused man, consumed by his work, who wasted no time in moving to accomplish his purpose. Determining first to squeeze the Mexicans into selling their land, in December 1845 he sent an emissary, John Slidell, to Mexico, with maximal demands (drawn up, as events showed, without much consideration for whether the Mexicans could accept them). However, no Mexican leader wanted the responsibility of meeting with him, as none dared to consider the unpalatable terms. Meanwhile, not relying on bullying alone, Polk sent the Trailblazer, John C. Fremont, to California to foment revolt against the Mexican authorities there. When by Christmas Slidell was not received, Polk quickly moved to the next stage. The U.S. officially annexed Texas, and to add a show of force where the Mexicans would feel it most, just two weeks after Texas statehood, he directed Gen. Zachary Taylor to advance his army to the Rio Grande, well within Mexican-claimed territory. Skirmishes immediately broke out. In one of them, on April 25, 1846, Mexican troops at Matamoros crossed just north of the Rio Grande and attacked an American patrol, killing about a dozen. The Mexican Army also laid siege to an American outpost along the Rio Grande. On May 8, 1846, Taylor commanded American forces at the Battle of Palo Alto, the first battle of the war. It was an American victory, one he followed up the next day with another success at the Battle of Resaca de la Palma. Taylor had defeated the Mexican forces even though they greatly outnumbered his own.

Polk was now out of patience with the Mexicans; he interpreted this incident as an act of aggression against the United States and asked Congress to declare war on Mexico, which it did on May 13 (on the basis of the shedding of "American blood upon American soil").

However, the war was a partisan issue in a nation already deeply divided by sectional rivalries. Southern Democrats, citing America’s Manifest Destiny to emerge as a continental power, supported the war. And though many Whigs supported the conflict, a large number, including former President John Quincy Adams, who was then serving in Congress, were opposed. They viewed the struggle as a power grab by slave-holding interests. Abraham Lincoln, who had been elected to Congress from Illinois as a Whig several months after war began, told the House: “This war is nondescript. … We charge the President with usurping the war-making power … with seizing a country … which had been for centuries, and was then in the possession of the Mexicans. … Let us put a check upon this lust of dominion. We had territory enough, Heaven knew.” Henry Clay declared, "This is no war of defense, but one of unnecessary and offensive aggression.”

On June 12, 1846, Taylor issued his official reports on the victorious battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. This contained correspondence and reports from Taylor and several others, with maps, charts, battle positions, and detailed lists of casualties. The reports gave significant details on the battles and the operations of the units that took part, and contained four maps that were highly detailed and very important. When Polk read these, he must have felt vindicated by these results and seen an opportunity to to both blunt criticism and outmaneuver his opponents. Rather than let them remain obscure documents in the archives of the War Department, he wanted them immediately distributed to both chambers of Congress to further his Mexican agenda.

Autograph letter signed, Washington, June 12, 1846, to “The Secretary of War. Should there not be duplicate copies of General Taylor’s Reports – that one may be sent to each House? It strikes me it would be proper.  If you think so, will you have a second copy prepared before 12 O’Clock that I may send the message today.”

Later that day, in accordance with this desire, Polk issued a Special Message to both houses of Congress, transmitting “herewith for the information of Congress, official reports received at the War Department from the officer commanding the Army on the Mexican frontier, giving a detailed report of the operations of the Army in that quarter, and particularly of the recent engagements between the American and Mexican forces. Polk was a very good strategist, and he was right to think that these reports would start chipping away at the opposition. With every victory, opponents of the war found it harder to maintain their position.

Letters of Polk as President relating to the Mexican War are rarities, and we have only carried about half a dozen over all our decades in the field. This one is of particular interest.