The Letter of Transit For the Instructions to the American Delegation Negotiating the Treaty of Ghent

The Secretary of State notifies the American Ambassador in Paris that the US would be dropping the insistence on including impressment.

This document has been sold. Contact Us

Surprisingly, the instructions told the U.S. negotiators, led by John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, to back off on demanding the end of impressment, though that was the cause of the war in the first place

The ongoing war in Europe had dominated American foreign policy since the days of George Washington,...

Read More

The Letter of Transit For the Instructions to the American Delegation Negotiating the Treaty of Ghent

The Secretary of State notifies the American Ambassador in Paris that the US would be dropping the insistence on including impressment.

Surprisingly, the instructions told the U.S. negotiators, led by John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, to back off on demanding the end of impressment, though that was the cause of the war in the first place

The ongoing war in Europe had dominated American foreign policy since the days of George Washington, but during James Madison’s administration the war spread to this hemisphere. Shortly after Madison took office, the failed embargo imposed by Thomas Jefferson was replaced with an act aimed just at France and Great Britain, which provided that if one of those belligerents would recognize its neutrality, especially at sea, the U.S. would halt trade with the other. France made a show of compliance, and the already French-leaning Madison took a step towards hostilities and reimposed nonintercourse with Great Britain. Meanwhile, many Americans in the west and south called War Hawks, led by such young up-and-coming men as Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun, were spoiling for war. They were hungry for glory and territorial expansion, and were confident that if the U.S. moved quickly, it could readily conquer Canada from Britain while it was preoccupied with Napoleon. The northeastern portion of the country was largely against the war, which it saw as unnecessary. Madison went along with the War Hawks nonetheless, and he asked Congress to declare a war that the U.S. was unready to wage and for which inadequate planning had been done.

The timing was also poor, as not long after war was declared, Napoleon’s Grand Army was decimated in Russia, and the British had men and ships to spare for a war in America. Instead of mostly a naval war as Americans had hoped, the British actually invaded the United States. U.S. forces achieved some victories, such as Perry’s defeat of the British at the Battle of Lake Erie, at the Battle of the Thames where the warrior Tecumseh was killed, and had some other successes in upstate New York and in the Western Theater of operations. However, the British took Detroit and the Canadians showed no inclination to join the United States, and fought against being compelled to do so. By the end of 1813, the war seemed to be a stalemate.

Great Britain’s priority was the war with France, and in October 1813 British foreign minister Lord Castlereagh offered to negotiate with the United States regarding peace. In January 1814 Madison agreed to peace talks in the neutral city of Ghent in Belgium, and sent off a delegation that included future president John Quincy Adams, War Hawk Senator Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell (the chargé d’affaires for Madison in Paris), former Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin, and James Ashton Bayard, a Delaware Senator. They did not leave for Europe for some time, however; and in the meantime, in April, Napoleon was defeated and abdicated, going into exile at Elba, and the Bourbon monarchy was restored in France. This theoretically freed up over 20,000 battle-hardened British troops in Europe to send to America, so there was concern in the U.S. about what would happen next. In April, Adams arrived in the Netherlands to start his mission. In May, Gallatin and Bayard were in London to size up the situation. Adams arrived at Ghent in June. The last day of June all American delegates were in Ghent but Gallatin, who had left Britain and arrived in Paris; he would join the others at Ghent soon after.

Concerned by the course of events and seeking a consensus, President Madison prepared a Cabinet Memorandum, which he submitted to his Cabinet on June 23-24, 1814. It asked: “1. Shall the surrender by Great Britain of the practice of impressment, in a treaty limited to a certain period, be an ultimatum?” Secretary of State James Monroe, Treasury Secretary George W. Campbell, Secretary of War John Armstrong, and Navy Secretary William Jones voted no, with Attorney General Richard Rush inclining but not insisting on yes. “2. Shall a treaty of peace, silent on the subject of impressment, be authorized?” All said no; but Armstrong and Jones, who voted yes. And “3. Shall a treaty be authorized comprising an article, referring the subject of impressment along with that of commerce to a separate negotiation?” Monroe, Campbell, Armstrong & Jones voted yes, Rush for awaiting further information from Europe.

On June 26, letters arrived from Gallatin and Bayard in London, which changed the picture, and Madison placed them before the Cabinet on June 27. The meeting notes state: “In consequence of the letters from Messrs. Bayard & Gallatin of May 6—7 and of other accounts from Europe, as to the ascendency & views of Great Britain and the dispositions of the great Continental powers, the…question…was put to the Cabinet, and agreed to by Monroe, Campbell, Armstrong & Jones; Rush being absent: our ministers to be instructed, besides trying the other conditions, to make a previous trial to insert or annex some declaration or protest against any inference from the silence of the Treaty on the subject of impressment, that the British claim was admitted or that of the United States abandoned.” So impressment might not be a provision of the treaty, so long as there was no admission that the American position had been wrong.

It was now urgent to inform the American delegation at Ghent of these positions. Monroe sent a lengthy letter of general instructions “to the American plenipotentiaries” dated June 27, 1814. This letter is quoted in Volume 5 of “The Writings of James Monroe”, and it shows that with the defeat of Napoleon, there was great concern among American leaders that the entire British force assembled to fight in Europe would now be diverted to fight them, and that the Spanish might join Britain, send forces to Louisiana and Florida, and hit the U.S. from there.  Monroe’s letter speculated on British war intentions, whether they were committed to continuing the conflict, and what they might demand at the peace conference. The American  imperative was to bring the conflict to a conclusion. Monroe wrote: “It appears by their communication that the British government will have the whole force lately employed against France at its disposal to be sent here; that the popular exultation, in consequence of the success against France, is great, and that the sentiment is general and strong for prosecuting the war against the United States, with vigor, with the most extravagant projects and confident hopes of success: that the restriction of our commerce and fisheries, curtailment of our boundaries, exclusion from the Lakes and even a dismemberment of our union, are among these projects. Mr. Bayard and Mr. Gallatin seem, however, to think that peace may be secured, by foregoing for the present to assert our rights on a principal object of the war; that tho’ they had reason to apprehend that the ministry, profiting of the circumstances of the moment, was more disposed to press an arrangement to prevent abuses in the practice than to pass the subject over in silence in a treaty…On mature consideration it has been decided that under all the circumstances above alluded to incident to a prosecution of the war, you may omit any stipulation on the subject of impressment, if found indispensably necessary to terminate it. You will of course not recur to this expedient until all your efforts to adjust the controversy in a more satisfactory manner have failed. As it is not the intention of the United States in suffering the treaty to be silent on the subject of impressment, to admit the British claim thereon or to relinquish that of the United States, it is highly important that any such inference be entirely precluded, by a declaration or protest in some form or other, that the omission is not to have any such effect or tendency. Any modification of the practice to prevent abuses, being an acknowledgment of the right in Great Britain, is utterly inadmissible.

“You will receive tonight several very important packets for Mr. Crawford [William Crawford, American Ambassador to France]

Accompanying this were two brief letters on specific points of negotiations, one dated June 25 and one June 27. The Henry Clay Papers state that Monroe’s June 25 letter contained as one provision a draft article for the treaty to the effect that if the British refused a stipulation to give up impressment, there could be a future meeting of commissioners from the two countries to negotiate with regard to commerce and impressment. Monroe’s letter of the 27th reads: “The Secretary [of State – Monroe himself] authorizes the omission of a stipulation on the subject of impressment, if found indispensably necessary to terminate the war…”

Autograph letter signed with franked cover as Secretary of State, Washington, June 27, 1814, to David Gelston, Collector of the Port of New York, being the letter of transit for the three letters to the U.S. negotiators, requiring Gelston’s personal involvement in securing delivery of the letters. “You will receive tonight several very important packets for Mr. Crawford [William Crawford, American Ambassador to France], to be delivered by the Olivier. You will have the goodness to deliver them to Mr. [George] de Caraman, late secretary of the French legation here, yourself, & to request him, in my name, to deliver them personally to Mr. Crawford. Always wishing your welfare & that of your family, I am your friend, James Monroe”. The free frank in Monroe’s hand indicates that there were four items here: this transit letter and the three letters for the U.S. negotiators; thus it is clear that the three letters accompanied this letter to Gelston, rather than coming later that evening. They were handed off to de Caraman, who was set sail with them on the French Brig Olivier, which had arrived in New York on June 9 flying the flag of the restored Bourbon dynasty, and so ran little if any risk of being taken at sea by the British or being refused entry in French ports. Thus was delivery safe-guarded and secured by using a ship of Royalist France.

The British and American negotiators opened their deliberations on August 8, 1814, when the British made several points that formed the basis of their position. The instructions for the Americans had not yet arrived, and they gave no answer at that meeting. As Frank A. Updyke wrote in his book, “The Diplomacy of the War of 1812”, “The American ministers, after returning to their rooms from the first meeting, deliberated upon the answer that they should make and the points that they should propose at the next conference. Despatches from the Secretary of State, written June 25 and 27, were received that same evening. The instructions of June 25 stated that the rights to the fisheries “must not be brought into discussion”; if they were insisted upon, negotiations were to cease. The commissioners were given authority to propose an article postponing impressment to a future negotiation. The despatch of June 27 allowed the commissioners, if it should be found necessary, to omit altogether any stipulation on the subject of impressment…The next day the American mission met…and agreed finally upon the answer and the points to be presented to the British ministers.”

The negotiations were successful, and the Treaty of Ghent was signed December 24, 1814. By the terms of the treaty, all conquered territory was to be returned, which meant that the British gave up lands near Lakes Superior and Michigan, and in Maine, while the Americans gave up land in Ontario. In short, little if anything had changed geographically from the way it had been before hostilities. Commissions were planned to settle the boundary of the United States and Canada.

News of the treaty took almost two months to cross the Atlantic, and meanwhile the war continued. In late August, a British army of approximately 4,000 took Washington, D.C. and burned a number of its buildings, including the White House and Capitol. On September 11, American naval force won a decisive victory at the Battle of Plattsburg on Lake Champlain, so the large British army was forced to abandon its invasion of the U.S. northeast and retreat to Canada. British forces had still not been informed of the end of hostilities in time to end their drive against the mouth of the Mississippi River. On January 8, 1815, a large British army attacked New Orleans and was decimated by an inferior American force under General Andrew Jackson in the most spectacular U.S. victory of the war. The American public heard of that battle and the Treaty of Ghent at approximately the same time, fostering a greater sentiment of self-confidence and shared identity throughout the young republic.

Frame, Display, Preserve

Each frame is custom constructed, using only proper museum archival materials. This includes:The finest frames, tailored to match the document you have chosen. These can period style, antiqued, gilded, wood, etc. Fabric mats, including silk and satin, as well as museum mat board with hand painted bevels. Attachment of the document to the matting to ensure its protection. This "hinging" is done according to archival standards. Protective "glass," or Tru Vue Optium Acrylic glazing, which is shatter resistant, 99% UV protective, and anti-reflective. You benefit from our decades of experience in designing and creating beautiful, compelling, and protective framed historical documents.

Learn more about our Framing Services