The Official Letter from the United States to the Free French Leadership, Written at President Roosevelt’s Direction by Lt. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Promising the Arming of the French to Take Back Their Country, and Affirming the Agreement at the Casablanca Conference

The Casablanca Conference was attended by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, and Henri Giraud

 

“The President points out that in the discussions held at Anfa [Casablanca], the intent was to arrive at a basic declaration of principles rather than to a detailed agreement of items or quantities. With full consideration being given to the overall war effort, it was the desire of all concerned that the program should be effected at the earliest possible moment…General Marshall has just advised me that 100,000 additional tons will be provided within the next three months. This is over and above the 95,000 tons per month for military and civil requirements which we have set aside for the French from our own allocated shipping. Accordingly, plans are being made for a special convoy for your military supplies…”

 

This is surely the most important war date Eisenhower letter we have ever carried, if not one of the most important of the entire war

The Casablanca Conference, sometimes referred to as the Anfa Conference, was held at the Anfa Hotel in Casablanca in French Morocco from January 14 to 24, 1943, to plan the Allied European strategy for the next phase of World War II. In attendance were President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Also attending were the sovereign of Morocco Sultan, and representing the Free French forces Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henry Giraud. Roosevelt and Churchill effected a rapprochement between Giraud, who was French Military and Civil Commander in Chief, and de Gaulle, leader of the Free French in exile, who had previously been opponents.

On February 6, Lt. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was named commander of the Allied armies in the African theater of operations (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco), based on a decision made by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca. Previously, Eisenhower’s command was limited to U.S. forces in North Africa. Early in the morning on February 19, the Germans struck Allied forces, and over the next week or so, inflicted heavy punishment upon them. Besides contending with the military situation, Eisenhower and President Roosevelt were dealing with another key issue, one with both military and foreign policy implications, and which could affect the course of the war and beyond: how to rearm Free French forces, allow them to participate in the North African campaign, and comply with the hope and desire of the French to take part in the eventual liberation of their homeland, yet balance that with the heavy claims on U.S. military resources in the present theater of war.

The rearmament of the French in North Africa raised a unique problem in coalition warfare for the U.S. military planners–rearming a whole foreign army. On the eve of the Chief of Staff’s departure for Casablanca, the Army planners had pointed out that re-equipping the French troops to make an effective contribution to the Allied cause was an urgent question for British and American consideration. At Casablanca General George Marshall urged the necessity of equipping the best French divisions in North Africa as rapidly as possible, but at the same time, Marshall and his advisers realized that equipping a whole new French army presented complicated problems. The President agreed with Marshall’s views. When General Giraud estimated that there were enough French officers and noncommissioned officers in North Africa to raise an army of 250,000, the President took the position that the French leader should be instructed to go ahead and that the British and Americans should make every effort to provide the necessary equipment. Marshall stated he was prepared to accept the inevitable delay in equipping U.S. forces then forming in the United States in order to equip a French army of 250,000 men. He assured General Giraud that it was in the interests of the United States to bring the French forces to a high degree of efficiency. The question was not whether to equip the French Army but rather how to carry out the program in the face of the limiting factor in all Allied undertakings – the shortage of shipping. The upshot of the negotiations at Casablanca was an Allied understanding that a program to equip the French Army should be started immediately.

In the weeks following Casablanca it became clear that U.S. and French military officials did not see eye to eye on what had been agreed upon at the conference. Maj. Gen. Marie Emile Bethouart, chief of the French military mission in Washington, brought the problem to Marshall’s attention in early February. He pointed out that, according to General Giraud’s version of his understanding with the President, an agreement had been reached to deliver material for three armored divisions, eight motorized divisions, and a first-line air force of 500 pursuit planes, 300 bombers, and 200 transport planes by summer; and that substantial amounts – 400 trucks, and enough armament for two armored regiments, three reconnaissance battalions, three tank destroyer battalions, and three motorized divisions – were to be delivered within the next few weeks. Marshall, who had left the conference before the conclusion of the President’s agreement with General Giraud, understood the President had simply promised that the United States would proceed to equip the French troops as quickly as possible, and that such problems as cargo space, types of equipment, and priorities of shipment would be settled later.

On 16 February Marshall referred to Eisenhower a request he had just received from General Béthouart for the equipment to complete the initial phase of the Anfa Plan. Béthouart was asking for an allocation of 100,000 tons monthly for the next two months over and above the 25,000 ton allotment authorized by the theater. Marshall gave instructions to explore the possibility of allocating more tonnage for the shipment of military equipment to the French. On February 19 U.S. General Somervell had announced that a special convoy of approximately 125,000 tons could be arranged for this purpose. The request submitted by the theater on February 18 called for the shipment of matériel to equip two infantry divisions, two regiments with Sherman tanks, three tank destroyer battalions, three reconnaissance battalions of the type contained in armored divisions, and twelve antiaircraft battalions. Operations Division gave the request a very high priority, so high in fact that American ground units in the United States were to be stripped of equipment if necessary to meet the French requirements.

The British demurred, but arrangements for the convoy proceeded. Arms and equipment on order were moved into ports and the convoy was assembled. The convoy consisting of fifteen cargo ships was to leave about March 19 and arrive in North Africa around April 11. It had been arranged with great difficulty for it represented a stiff demand on a very tight shipping situation. Not all the equipment assigned on February 20 amounting to some 150,000 tons could be lifted in the fifteen ships. It was agreed that items left behind would be shipped as soon as practicable. Also to go later was a substantial amount of the air equipment requested on February 14. All together the matériel to be shipped on convoys for which assignment either had been obtained or was then pending substantially exceeded the equipment listed by General Béthouart on February 15. With it General Giraud would be able to equip 3 infantry divisions, 2 armored regiments, 4 tank destroyer battalions, 5 reconnaissance battalions, 14 40mm anti-aircraft, 12 truck companies, and air units representing more than 200 airplanes. In actuality these shipments would complete the first phase of the ANFA Plan. Béthouart could well be pleased with the arrangements just concluded, and aware of the important part which Marshall had played in shaping them, the French representative expressed to him his personal appreciation in a letter of thanks.

The announcement regarding the special convoy could not have reached General Eisenhower at a more appropriate time for he was about to convey to General Giraud the President Roosevelt’s interpretation of the ANFA. In a February 23, 1943, letter to Giraud, Eisenhower first stressed the United States Government’s desire and policy to equip the French forces properly as fast as shipping be allocated for that purpose. He then broke the news about the special convoy. The decision of the War Department to set it up, he pointed out in conclusion, was a further evidence of “our desire to share with you to the fullest extent possible consistent with the means at our disposal”. At the close of the six week period extending from the opening session of the Casablanca Conference to February 23 when Eisenhower wrote to Giraud, the Americans as well as the French could point with satisfaction to the great strides being made toward the rearming of the North African forces. The principle of a rearmament had been recognized by the American government and made the subject of an explicit statement Eisenhower had made on behalf of the U.S. government. Finally Ike mentioned that a substantial amount of equipment was about to leave the United States for North African ports, a tangible proof of the American intent to carry through the promises made at Anfa.

This is that very letter outlining American policy and actions toward the Free French. It appears in numerous history books that deal with rearming Free French forces to take part in the war. Typed letter signed, on his Allied Force Headquarters, Office of the Commander-in-Chief letterhead, with American troops in North Africa, 23 February 1943, to General Giraud, being the official American notification to the French of U.S. policy in these areas.

“In our recent conversations, we have discussed the clarification of the Anfa Conference and its effect upon a definite program for the rearmament of the French North African forces. I have just received a message from the President who wishes me to inform you that it is the policy and desire of the United States Government that the French Armies in North Africa shall take part in the liberation of France, side by side with American and Allied Soldiers, and that to this end, the French troops should be properly equipped, Accordingly, it is the United States Government’s intention that the necessary materiel shall be delivered as soon as shipping can be allocated. However, the assignment of shipping for this purpose must, of necessity, be coordinated with the overall military requirements of this theater of war.

“The President points out that in the discussions held at Anfa, the intent was to arrive at a basic declaration of principles rather than to a detailed agreement of items or quantities. With full consideration being given to the overall war effort, it was the desire of all concerned that the program should be effected at the earliest possible moment. Your requests for specific items were received with the thought that they would be studied as soon as possible and coordinated
in Washington with our commitments in other theaters of war, such as Russia, China, and the Southwest Pacific. No final schedules were considered possible until this problem had been coordinated and a definite Program could be drawn up in terms of available shipping. Endorsement of these conversations “in principle” was evidence of our keen desire to meet French requirements as fully as the entire war effort permitted.

“In response to my latest telegram, General Marshall has just advised me that 100,000 additional tons will be provided within the next three months. This is over and above the 95,000 tons per month for military and civil requirements which we have set aside for the French from our own allocated shipping. Accordingly, plans are being made for a special convoy for your military supplies, which I believe will provide for the delivery of the materiel listed in paragraph five of the cable handed to you by Colonel Holmes on February 17.

“In view of the present critical shortage of shipping to carry out this program, I am appreciative of the offer made in your letter of February 22nd to slow down the movements of troops from West Africa in order to expedite the release of the Colombie [a French merchant ship that was being converted into a troopship] to the shipping pool. Your further suggestion of speeding up the repair of the retraining cargo vessels allocated to the pool will likewise assist our common effort.

“I trust that the above will clarify the present situation and serve as further evidence of our desire to share with you to the fullest extent possible, consistent with the means at our disposal.”

This is surely the most important war date Eisenhower letter we have ever carried, if not one of the most important of the entire war to reach the market.