In 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt Demands Proof That Strikes Are Interfering With the War Effort Before Taking Anti-Labor Action

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Germany soon followed by declaring war on the United Sates, Americans found themselves plunged into the Second World War. AFL and CIO leaders made no-strike pledges, voluntarily agreeing to forego work stoppages for the duration of the war. In 1941, there had been quite a number of strikes, and the concern labor sought to address was the possible loss of man hours producing essential war equipment and supplies. Tanks, ships, planes, and trucks were particularly needed; as President Roosevelt memorably said, the U.S. was the “arsenal of democracy.”

FDR knew the statistics about strikes that were beginning to come in. Looking at the year 1942 as compared to 1941, there was a substantial decline in strike activity. During the year there were 2,968 strikes, involving approximately 840,000 workers and 4,183,000 man-days of idleness. But these figures amount to less than they seem because of the number of workers and man-hours put in. Only about 28 workers out of 1,000 employed were involved in any strike at some time during the year, and idleness during strikes was estimated to be 1/20th of 1% of the time worked. A de minimus amount.

As compared with 1941, there was a decline of 31% in the number of strikes, 64% in the number of workers involved, and 82% in strike idleness. Usually, in times of rapidly increasing employment, industrial activity, and rising living costs, strikes become more numerous; despite these factors being present, this was not the case, however, in 1942. And the decline in strike activity took place in spite of the fact that industrial production was 16% higher and the average number of employed workers was 7% greater than in 1941, while the average cost of living rose about 10%. The fact that the decline in the number of workers involved was more pronounced than the decrease in number of stoppages, and the decrease in idleness still more pronounced than either, indicates that the strikes which took place were smaller and of shorter duration, than those in 1941.

President Roosevelt was happy with this. He had a no-strike pledge from the largest unions doing the main war work, and though some workers engaged in “wildcat strikes” (strikes without union approval), FDR saw a huge drop in strike idleness and that the strikes were small ones and short besides. This despite the fact that by war’s end, union membership had grown to 14.7 million, five times what it had been at the beginning of the Roosevelt administration. Everyone was rowing in the same boat, doing whatever possible to achieve victory.

But not everyone was satisfied with labor’s cooperation. A. Leonard Allen was a Congressman from Louisiana and part of Huey Long’s cabal, which was not a friend to labor. Allen was a proponent of the law excluding Chinese from immigrating to the United States, and introduced the Renunciation Act of 1944, in the hopes that Japanese-Americans would leave and go back to Japan. He considered labor unions monopolistic and opposed the Fair Employment Practice Commission on the grounds that discrimination would be hard to prove and leave employers open to specious liability.

Allen wrote to FDR complaining about strikes. Roosevelt responded implicitly saying he was having none of it, and asking Allen to show proof that strikes were damaging the war effort.

Typed letter signed, on White House letterhead, Washington, March 21, 1942, to Allen. “Thank you for yours of March 19, You speak of wide dissatisfaction throughout the land regarding strikes. I do wish you would tell me where they are at the present time – and what portion of war work hours of labor have been lost through strikes since January 1, 1942. As you can well imagine, it is difficult to take positive action without specific knowledge of facts.”

FDR was right to be wary, as there were only two instances of the U.S. government took action against labor during the war. A major coal strike by the United Mine Workers in mid-1943 led Congress to pass, over the President’s veto, the War Labor Disputes Act to break that strike, and in 1944 FDR sent troops into Philadelphia to break a transit strike. Just that in four years of massive production and war.

Letters of Roosevelt from World War II relating to the war are increasingly uncommon. This letter comes to us directly from Congressman Allen’s scrapbook of mementos, and has never before been offered for sale.