On His March to Atlanta, General William Tecumseh Sherman States the Goal of His Mission and Describes The Terrain and Action on His March Through the South
A spectacular, all encompassing letter, and one of the best of Sherman to ever reach the market, covering: His march through the South to that point; the strategic purpose and goal of his entire campaign in Georgia, and his view of its success; his opinion on the importance of taking and holding Atlanta; the tactical issues he faced operating in hostile territory without supplies and maps, against a dug in foe; his eschewing of personal glory; his view of the rightful place of leaders in times of upheaval, and his belief that pride comes before a fall; his friendship for and clear subordination to U.S.Grant; his refusal to fight back against small-minded detractors; and his interesting feeling that offensive warfare had a lower success ratio that defensive.
On leadership: “In times of Revolution like these, all the leaders must fall in succession till the end is approached and the less our elevation the less our fall”
On the march through the South: “It has been one grand skirmish. Mountains and forests so obscuring the ground that I have...
On leadership: “In times of Revolution like these, all the leaders must fall in succession till the end is approached and the less our elevation the less our fall”
On the march through the South: “It has been one grand skirmish. Mountains and forests so obscuring the ground that I have not seen 10 thousand of the enemy at any one time though by advancing my lines at any one time a hundred yards in the past month we would draw the fire one hundred guns and fifty or sixty thousand muskets at point blank range….We have each party made many dashes but invariably the assailant gets the worst of it. ”
On the goal of his mission: “As my chief task was and is to hold this army away from Virginia I feel that I have accomplished it and hope to continue to do so… Of course I shall endeavor to reach the Railroads that center in Atlanta but care not about Atlanta itself.
The Atlanta Campaign followed the Union victory in the Battles for Chattanooga in November 1863; Chattanooga was known as the “Gateway to the South”, and its capture opened that gateway. After Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to general-in-chief of all Union armies, he left his favorite subordinate from his time in command of the Western Theater, William T. Sherman, in charge of the Western armies. Grant’s strategy was to apply pressure against the Confederacy in several coordinated offensives. While he, George G. Meade, Benjamin Butler, and the armies of the Potomac and the James advanced in Virginia against Robert E. Lee, and Nathaniel Banks attempted to capture Mobile, Alabama, Sherman was assigned the mission of defeating Johnston’s army, capturing Atlanta, and striking through Georgia and the Confederate heartland. As Grant attacked in the North, Sherman was to keep reinforcements necessary to the Confederate effort tied up in the South. This would lead to one of the great military movements of the war – Sherman’s march through the South and to the sea – which is considered to be one of the major achievements of the war and speeded its end. Sherman’s bold moves of operating deep within enemy territory and without supply lines, needing to live off the land and operating in a hostile area and without proper maps or guidance, would eventually break the back of the South and illustrate its vulnerability.
Also around this time, General Don Carlos Buell, a general present with Sherman at the near-defeat at Shiloh, began to argue that Grant’s army was saved only by the timely arrival of his [Buell’s] Army of the Ohio near sundown on April 6. Grant claimed his army was in a strong position with heavy lines of infantry supporting massed artillery. His effort to trade space for time throughout the day of April 6 had worked; Sherman and Grant had spent so much time in successive defensive positions that daylight was fading by the time the last Confederate assaults began, and Grant was convinced that his army could have handled those attacks. Buell, on the other hand, painted a picture of a dilapidated Army of the Tennessee on the brink of defeat. Only his arrival with fresh columns of Army of the Ohio troops won the day. In 1864, a friend contacted him about a suggested publication of correspondence and other information to support Sherman’s defense of his actions at Shiloh.
This is his response to a publisher’s letter offering to help in the publication of his Shiloh defense and an article on his movements. Sherman’s response covers every aspect of importance to him at the time: his march through the South to that point; the strategic purpose and goal of his entire campaign in Georgia, and his view of its success; his opinion on the importance of taking and holding Atlanta; the tactical issues he faced operating in hostile territory without supplies and maps, against a dug in foe; his eschewing of personal glory; his view of the rightful place of leaders in times of upheaval, and his belief that pride comes before a fall; his friendship for and clear subordination to U.S.Grant; his refusal to fight back against small-minded detractors; and his interesting feeling that offensive warfare had a lower success ratio that defensive.
Autograph letter signed, In the field, near Marietta, Georgia, June 28, 1864, to magazine publisher Prof. H. Copper at the University of Pennsylvania. “Dear sir, Your note of the 20th is just received. You may hand my letter to Col. Bowman, who is a good friend of mine but almost too much of a panegyrist. Still as I must stand the infliction and as you are committed the thing had better appear as Bowman’s own production, checked by my notes, and the record of dates which he has doubtless got from the war office. He can soon modify his present sketch to make it conform to the facts I have stated, and also abridge it as much as possible, and deal in as little unnecessary praise as possible.
“In times of Revolution like these, all the leaders must fall in succession till the end is approached and the less our elevation the less our fall. For similar reasons I prefer that my communication as to Grant should not be published on my signature unless Grant asks it. You may cause a copy to go to him and if he desires it you may use it but not as early as the August semester. Say the one after. I don’t to be drawn into a controversy and suppose Buell’s friends, who are now a little sore on the point might delight in a controversy. I think a short circular letter addressed by you to McPherson and Wallace, McClernand, Hurlbut and Rawlins would elicit the full truth, after which some military critic could take the whole and come to a fair conclusion.
“Topography enters so largely into all military plans and activities that no one without proper maps can understand our movements down here. I cannot pause to make a military record of my campaign yet. But will at some future time. It has been one grand skirmish. Mountains and forests so obscuring the ground that I have not seen 10 thousand of the enemy at any one time though by advancing my lines at any one time a hundred yards in the past month we would draw the fire one hundred guns and fifty or sixty thousand muskets at point blank range. I have been compelled to move literally for miles to turn a line or succession of lines of parapets which though made in two or three days have all the essentials of a permanent work, ditch, parapet, embrasure, and the very best kind of abatis and pallasades.
“We have each party made many dashes but invariably the assailant gets the worst of it. I am now at such a distance from my base and the capacity of my Railroad is so limited and the country is so bare of forage and provisions that I am forced to move with great caution and slowness. But as my chief task was and is to hold this army away from Virginia I feel that I have accomplished it and hope to continue to do so. To take attention is not the sole object though one. Without better maps than you possess a military critique would be misunderstood. I have already passed on a hundred miles including the only nitre-producing, the great iron and coal beds of Georgia and its best wheat-producing region. Of course I shall endeavor to reach the Railroads that center in Atlanta but care not about Atlanta itself. I cannot design a plan on the limited supplies that reach me.
“I approve most highly your magazine and will be most happy to contribute as soon as I reach the region of post offices and paymasters. I want military men to judge of military acts. And then strangle the miserable class of scribblers that have been generated in our country with impudence and ignorance enough to make one reject the act of printing.” The Bowman he mentions went on to write the first biography of Sherman, which appeared in 1865.
We have researched other war date Sherman letters that have reached the marketplace over the past forty years, and as far as war content, this is clearly within the best half dozen. But when it comes to Sherman’s opinions, philosophy, tactics, strategy, and view of his mission, this stands in a class by itself.

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