The Articles of the Treaty of Ghent in the Hands of the American Peace Negotiators, Along with Their Original Instructions to End the War of 1812

An unprecedented archive, acquired from the descendant of the recipient who was an active participant, and never previously offered for sale.

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The first peace treaty signed by the US under the Constitution

A note on provenance: Acquired from the direct descendants of William H. Crawford, the recipient. Crawford was U.S. ambassador to France during the negotiations to end the War of 1812. During those negotiations, Crawford was responsible for superintending the American consuls...

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The Articles of the Treaty of Ghent in the Hands of the American Peace Negotiators, Along with Their Original Instructions to End the War of 1812

An unprecedented archive, acquired from the descendant of the recipient who was an active participant, and never previously offered for sale.

The first peace treaty signed by the US under the Constitution

A note on provenance: Acquired from the direct descendants of William H. Crawford, the recipient. Crawford was U.S. ambassador to France during the negotiations to end the War of 1812. During those negotiations, Crawford was responsible for superintending the American consuls in Europe and keeping them informed of developments. More than that, he was an advisor to the President on the happenings on the Continent. As Ambassador to the Court of one of the two major adversaries in the conflicts in Europe, he was also actively involved in the negotiation process, advising the negotiators and responding to their confidential communiqués.  He would later serve as Secretary of War and Secretary of the Treasury under Presidents Madison and Monroe.  His descendants sold their archive to the Raab Collection.

(Skip to the list of documents included)

Background on the War

The War of 1812 was the result of the impulse of the young American republic to expand western and assert the reality of its independence. It was a bold and dangerous gamble, one that paid off but could have ended otherwise.

The 1783 Treaty of Paris ending the American Revolution awarded the western frontier to the United States, but the British did not give up the idea of setting up a Native American buffer state between its holdings and the U.S. on that frontier. This hoped-for state would be shaped like a dagger and descend from the Canadian border on a line from the center point of Ohio west to the Mississippi River and reach to the far south of the Illinois Territory. It would act as a block to American immigration west, hinder U.S. use of the new Louisiana Purchase lands and the Mississippi River, discourage American trade in the west to the benefit of British merchants, set up an ally on the western border of the U.S., and make Canada safer from potential U.S. incursions.

After the Napoleonic Wars broke out the attention of the British was focused on Europe, and they scaled back the effort to empower the Indians to avoid antagonizing the United States. But by the late 1790s, from their forts in Ontario, the British were back supplying and arming the Indians living in what is now the United States. By 1810 the Native Americans were ready to organize and were presenting a serious threat to American pioneers and interests. Two visionary Shawnee Indian leaders, Tecumseh and his brother The Prophet, realized that if US encroachment onto Indian land was ever to be stopped, this was the time. They rallied a broad Indian alliance to fight the white settlers. The alliance promised to sign over no more land to the whites, and the various tribes of the region promised to work together. The British were aiding and financing the Indian alliance from Canada. Though Tecumseh was defeated in Indiana by General William Henry Harrison in 1811, in 1812 threats of Indian uprisings remained a reality.

American trade was in a state of crisis by 1812. The British were seizing American ships on the high seas, and forcing seamen to join the Royal Navy or merchant navy.  This impressment of seamen was deemed necessary because of the difficulty in obtaining enough recruits in Britain. Americans considered this action as a violation of their sovereignty, a real slap in the face. In addition, Britain seized vessels bound for Europe that did not first call at a British port. France retaliated, confiscating vessels if they had first stopped in Britain. The loss to the American economy was enormous.

Pushing for war in 1812 were the War Hawks, a group of prominent Congressmen mainly from the west and south, led by House Speaker Henry Clay, and also including John C. Calhoun, Langdon Cheves (his successor as Speaker), and about twenty others. They strongly supported westward expansion, wanted to end the buffer state idea for all time, and were desirous of adding Canada to the American union. On June 1, 1812, President James Madison, sufficiently persuaded by the pro-war position, sent the U.S. Congress a war message, and three days later the House of Representatives voted 79 to 49 to declare war against Britain. In the next two weeks, the U.S. Senate debated the House's bill and on June 17, by a vote of 19 to 13, passed the bill.

The vacillating fortunes of war

The U.S. was unprepared for war, however, and the fortunes of war proved vacillating. There were successes, such as William Henry Harrison’s victory in the Battle of the Thames, in which Tecumseh was killed, and Oliver H. Perry’s victory on Lake Erie. But there were also failures, such as a winter expedition against Montreal; also, Fort Niagara was lost, Black Rock and Buffalo were burned, and great quantities of provisions and stores destroyed. The British blockade of the U.S. eastern seaboard was constantly growing more rigid; not a single American man-of-war was on the open sea. Meanwhile the discontent with the war prevailing in New England, which was destined to culminate in the Hartford Convention, continued to be active and to threaten rebellious outbreaks. But the most ominous events were the downfall of Napoleon’s prospects, the likely conclusion of peace in Europe, and, in consequence, the liberation of the military, naval, and financial resources of Great Britain for a vigorous prosecution of the war in America.

The mediation prelude to peace negotiations

Napoleon invaded Russia in late 1812, and was famously forced to retreat in disarray. But the war continued, and Russia and Russia’s interests were still at risk. Tsar Alexander I saw his ally Britain, whose participation would make the difference, preoccupied with a war with the United States that he considered a side show. Anxious to disentangle Britain from the American war, and to increase his influence in European affairs, in March 1813 Alexander offered through U.S. ambassador to Russia, John Quincy Adams, to mediate the War of 1812. He presented documents detailing its mediation offer to Secretary of State James Monroe on February 27, 1813. Monroe accepted the offer on March 11, and in May sent Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin and former Senator James Bayard to join Adams in St. Petersburg as negotiators. Prior to their leaving, Madison had Monroe prepare instructions to be used by them.

A month later, in June, William H. Crawford was sent to Paris as the new U.S. ambassador to France, with orders to demand the repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees (put in place by Napoleon to attempt to strangle the British Islands, but in doing so interfering with U.S. commerce), to protest violations of American trading interests, and to attempt to negotiate a commercial treaty. Crawford received a copy of Monroe’s instructions to the negotiators.

The British rejected the concept of third-party mediation, but remained interested in peace talks. In the fall of 1813, after the defeat of Napoleon at Leipzig, British foreign minister Lord Castlereagh offered to negotiate directly with the United States in the neutral city of Ghent in Belgium. In January 1814, President Madison agreed to peace talks in the neutral city of Ghent in Belgium. The instructions prepared for the mediation were then used to commence the negotiations at Ghent, remaining the only formal instructions issued by the U.S. government to its negotiators.

Six Key Men: The American Negotiators at Ghent and the Continent

The head of the American negotiating team was John Quincy Adams, the U.S.’s most experienced diplomat. The four men who served with him were carefully selected by President Madison to reflect the varieties of political sentiment in the United States. Foremost among them was Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and a noted War Hawk. Albert Gallatin had served as Secretary of the Treasury for both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. James Bayard was a U.S. Senator belonging to the Federalist Party who had been an opponent of the war, and was one of the 13 Senators to vote against declaring it. However, once the war began he supported the war effort. Jonathan Russell was acting U.S. ambassador to Britain when war was declared. Sent to Ghent as a negotiator, he was also serving as ambassador to Sweden and Norway. He proved instrumental in achieving the final peace terms.  William H. Crawford was placed in France.

 

The Treaty of Ghent: Negotiations Get Underway

The American envoys all arrived in Ghent on July 6, 1814, but the negotiations did not get underway until August 8. At the opening of the negotiation the British demanded that the country now occupied by the states of Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin, the larger part of Indiana, and about one third of Ohio, should be set apart for the Indians, to constitute a sort of Indian sovereignty under British guaranty, and to serve as a "buffer," a perpetual protection of the British possessions against American ambition. They demanded also that the United States should relinquish the right of keeping any armed vessels on the Great Lakes; and, in addition to all this, they asked for the cession of a piece of Maine, and for the right of navigating the Mississippi. This all added up to a surrender of American independence and was a painful shock to the U.S. envoys. All they could do was promptly reject the conditions. But the leading statesmen in Britain were not at all anxious to insist on these maximal demands, fearing that the war would be a long affair, and that some of their European allies would favor the Americans, thus diving their coalition. Moreover, the situation in Europe remained unstable, and the British people were tired of war. Was it not more prudent after all to let the Americans off without a cession of territory? The Duke of Wellington was consulted; he emphatically expressed himself against any demand which would "afford the Americans a proper and creditable ground" for declining to make peace. The British commissioners were instructed accordingly. President Madison had in the meantime sent instructions authorizing the U.S. negotiators to treat on the basis of the status ante-bellum – substantially, to restore things to the state in which the war had found them. The British would finally accept this basis, and the Americans discussed giving up their contention for definite stipulations concerning the principles of blockade and the impressment question.

In November there was still no comprehensive document covering all the war’s issues, nor was their unanimity within the delegations themselves as to what to demand and concede. Then on November 10, the Americans finally agreed on draft language for a comprehensive treaty to provide to the British as a basis of negotiation. This was the first draft treaty of Ghent, and it contained 15 points.

The Treaty of Ghent: Finding Common Ground

The British approved most of the articles in the draft, but disputes remained with regard to the British right to the navigation of the Mississippi, the American right to fish in British waters off Canada, and the text relating to Indian lands. Since British support for the Indians was a main reason U.S. War Hawks wanted the conflict, the Americans were adamant on this point. And now that peace was in the offing and the government in London (and the Duke of Wellington) wanted it sooner rather than later, the British were prepared to abandon their promises to the Indians of not agreeing to a treaty without taking their interests into account. But suitable language must be found to provide them cover.

The American team had four attorneys – Adams, Clay, Russell and Bayard – and they had no trouble in coming up with a text that would make the British appear to be taking the Indian into account, while leaving the Americans to do as they wanted in the west. The key was the word “may”, as the article awarded the Indians the “possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to” in 1811. Since each side could bring its own interpretation of the meaning of “may”, it was the perfect lawyer’s solution. The British accepted this, and it became Article 9 of the treaty.

At last, after long and angry discussions, after much sending of notes and replies (in which the American envoys displayed great skill in argument), and after repeated references of the disputed points by the British commissioners to the Foreign Office in London and long waiting for answers, the British government declared that it was willing to accept American language relating to the Indians, and a treaty silent on both subjects other – the fisheries as well as the navigation of the Mississippi. This declaration reached the American commissioners December 22, 1814, and with it the last obstacle to a final agreement was removed.

The Treaty of Ghent: The Final Treaty

The fundamental basis of the peace: stop the war with few preconditions, and leave the other issues between the two nations to further negotiations in peacetime in the future. But in addition to the written provisions of the treaty, there were unwritten understandings of enormous significance. This made the Treaty of Ghent one of the most important ever signed by the United States.

Impact of the War of 1812

The United States gave up its designs on Canada, which left Britain free to cease looking over its shoulder at North America. It could concentrate its efforts elsewhere. In return, Britain stopped supporting the Indians in the “buffer state” in their fight against the encroaching Americans. Their withdrawal was the death knell to the Indian’s efforts; and they were the true losers in the war. The way to the American west was now open, the great impediment removed.

The United States gained in another way – domestically – as the turning away from old enemies and issues led to the molding of a separate American future. The war’s end unified the country and led to the Era of Good Feeling. As Albert Gallatin said,“They are more Americans; they feel and act more as a nation”. It let loose a burst of energy in emigration, commerce and invention that changed the face of the country. And it also led to the rise of Andrew Jackson, and to the Jacksonian democracy he embodied.

The Treaty of Ghent itself proved to be a milestone in American foreign policy. The commissions called for by the treaty were successful in resolving disputes, showing that the Americans and British could work together and honor the spirit of their agreements, and just as importantly that their interests need not be antithetical. The U.S. Foreign Service had come of age.

The Archive

1) The First Set of Instructions Issued to the American Peace Negotiators Commissioned to End the War of 1812

The complete 63-page document, of great importance, ultimately resulted in the Treaty of Ghent, is identified in the American State Papers as “Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, to the Plenipotentiaries of the United States for treating of peace with Great Britain”

This is William H. Crawford’s copy, with his docket, given to him when he went to Europe as U.S. ambassador to France, and descended through his family until now

Here is the complete set of the elaborate instructions sent to the negotiators as they left for Europe, dated April 15, 1813 and numbering 63 pages, all in a clerical hand but identified in the American State Papers as “Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, to the Plenipotentiaries of the United States for treating of peace with Great Britain”; this being Crawford’s own copy, provided by the State Department, and with Crawford’s docket.

These instructions state in part:

"The impressment of seamen and illegal blockades were the principal cause of the war," which would "cease as soon as these rights are respected." The document discusses in detail how citizens of the U.S. or subjects of Great Britain may legally be naturalized by the other country, or serve on each others ships. It sets both fines and prison terms for violations of any new laws by individuals and commanders. The President insists that a "Treaty" with a "clear and distinct provision shall be made against the practice" of impressment. He is also against allowing British Cruisers to stop and search U.S. vessels, which practice "withholds the respect due our flag, by not allowing it to protect the crew sailing under it". It continues, "It is expected that all American seamen who have been impressed will be discharged…The great object which you have to secure, in regard to impressment, is, that our flag shall protect the crew" – and in return, we will agree not to "employ her [British] seamen in the service of the United States.” The document maintains that "Impressment is utterly repugnant to the law of nations, is supported by no Treaty with any Nation, was never acquiesced in by any and a submission to it by the United States would be the abandonment of all Claim to Neutral Rights, and of all other rights on the ocean." It discusses "Allegiance" as it pertains to the political relation between a Sovereign and his people. "It is certain that no Sovereign has a right to pursue his subjects into the territory of another…That the vessels of a nation are considered a part of its territory is a principle too well established to be brought into discussion."

It takes the position that "The flag of a Nation protects everything sailing under it in time of peace." "The people of the United States,” it continues, “roused by the causes and the progress of the war are rapidly acquiring military habits and becoming a military people….Our knowledge in Naval tactics has increased, as has our Maritime strength…In addition, our manufacturers have taken an astonishing growth." It argues that “Britain has everything to lose and nothing to gain by pursuing this war and she can ill afford a fight on two fronts.”

Another major object of the negotiations was to be the British blockades. “We also need to be assured that no further interference with our commerce between Enemy’s Colonies and their parent Country" will take place. Other practices of the British Navy such as stopping vessels and demanding papers, seizing cargo coming from enemy ports, and interdicting the commerce of neutral powers in any way needs to be addressed. "Your first duty will be to conclude a peace with Great Britain, if you obtain a satisfactory stipulation against impressment…If your efforts to accomplish it should fail, all further negotiations will cease, and you will return home without delay." But "It is deemed lightly important also to obtain a definition of the Neutral Rights which I have brought to your attention, especially of blockades."

Next it takes up the question of the British arming and supplying the Indians. The article in the Treaty of 1794 "allowing "British traders from Canada and the North to trade with the Indian Tribes in the U.S., must not be renewed." This treaty had ultimately resulted in native forces being used against "our Western States and Territories.” “No stipulation must restrict the future growth of our Navy, its use on lakes held in common or our ability to restrict traders from navigating our waterways." It concluded that, "Most of the wars which have disturbed the world in modern times have originated with Great Britain and France." Therefore, "A good intelligence between the United States and Russia respecting Neutral Rights may have an important influence in securing them from violation, in any future wars, and may even tend to prevent war to the advantage of all nations."

2) The First Draft of the Treaty of Ghent, As Sent by the US Negotiators to the British Commissioners in November 1814

An extraordinary document in the hand of American negotiator Jonathan Russell, sent, along with his report on the negotiations and treaty, to the US Ambassador to France, William H. Crawford, who was central to US strategy on the Continent and the main figure in the US diplomatic corps in Europe

Autograph report and treaty signed by Jonathan Russell, 4 densely written pages, Ghent, November 24, 1814, to Crawford. Some of the treaty articles are presented by Russell in full, while others are summarized. “Without having been deceived relative to the disposition of the majority on the subject of the free navigation of the Mississippi I am happy to inform you that this position was not inflexible, and we finally transmitted our project without the article that had at first been carried.  This article was as follows. “The right and liberty of the people and inhabitants of the United States to take, dry, and cure fish in places within the exclusive jurisdiction of Great Britain (as recognized and secured by the former treaty of peace) and the privilege of the navigation of the Mississippi within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States as secured to the subjects of Great Britain by the same treaty are hereby recognized and confirmed. Besides the objections to such an article which had occurred to you and which have not skipped us the blending the two points together and making them mutually dependent on each other, which was not done in the treaty of 1783, made this article the more exceptionable.

“The project which we finally presented consists of 15 articles”. These sometimes lengthy articles are summarized in a few words below:

First.  Peace and the mutual restoration of all territory, places, possessions, and of all archives, records, deeds, and papers, either public or private, taken by either party during the war – no destruction or carrying away any artillery or other public property or slaves or other private property to be permitted…

Second. All vessels and effects taken after certain periods (left blank) in different parts of the world to be respectively restored…

Third and Fourth. Appoint commissioners to determine the Maine-Canada boundary line.

Fifth and Sixth. Appoint commissioners to determine the boundary from the Iroquois land to Lake Superior and the Northwest woods.

Seventh. Authorizes the commissioners to employ surveyors and assistants.

Eighth. Establish the 49th Parallel as the basic U.S./Canada border.

Ninth. Indian pacification must be agreed upon.

Tenth. The British must stop arming, supplying and instigating the Indians.

Eleventh. Each party to exclude from naval or commerce service seamen of the other party.

Twelfth. Defining the blockade.

Thirteenth. Indemnification for injuries done before and during hostilities.

Fourteenth. A general amnesty for citizens of the other party.

Fifteenth. Dealing with the exchange of ratifications.

The bottom line for the Americans: “Such is the general outline of the articles which we presented and which we accompanied with an explanatory note. In this note we give the adverse party pretty distinctly to understand that the status antebellum is a sine qua non although we do not say so in terms, and we have distinctly given them to understand that none of the other articles would be insisted on by us, which has somewhat the appearance I confess of stifling our project at its birth.  I would willingly have had the following sentence omitted not only because it seem to be to be all time but because it may be construed to mean more than I should like to concede. ‘The undersigned cannot agree to any other principal than that of a mutual restoration of territory and have accordingly prepared an article founded on that basis. They are willing even to extend the same principle to the other objects in dispute between the two nations, and in proposing all the other articles included in this project they wish to be distinctly understood that they are ready to sign a treaty placing the two countries in respect to all the subjects of difference between them in the same state in which they were at the commencement of the present war, reserving to each party all its rights and leaving whatever may remain in controversy between them for future and Pacific negotiation.

“After this declaration it cannot be expected that are our articles relative to impressment, indemnity, non-employment of Indians, or even amnesty will be gratuitously accorded by the other party. In offering these articles by way of experiment would it not have been well to have given them at least a fair chance of consideration and to have forced our adversary to have assigned his reasons for their rejection.  We should always have been at liberty to have withdrawn them. It seems indeed preposterous to make and then waive a proposition in the same communication. I'm afraid however that it is something worse than a mere negative proceeding as applicable to the project itself. I am afraid that it is not only a confession that we are ready to consent to putting an end to the war without having gained a single point for which it was made and which would imply that for such causes we would not again make war, but admits the construction of the articles of the treaty of 1794 relative to the Mississippi are to be revived. If it is said that these matters were not subjects of difference it can be answered that it would be absurd to place points that were not in controversy in a worse situation than those which were; to agree not to adjust points that were disputed and to insist on disputing those which were adjusted, and to make by each party’s reserving all its rights the reservation of those only which were deemed by the other party. I regret this declaration the more as I begin to believe the enemy will avail himself of it to put an end to a war by which he perceives that he has but little chance of obtaining either Glory or aggrandizement.  The late news from America must have lowered his pretensions and he will now make peace unless from wounded pride he shall determine on a desperate attempt to redeem his best honor.  Our note and the project were delivered on the 10th, now 14 days since and we have as yet received no answer. They have afforded it appears matter for deliberation and I should not be surprised if the intelligence should influence the decision which may be taken upon them. At any rate the answer we may receive will probably have a definite character as the adverse party must either accept our basis or drive us from the negotiation.”

3) The Final Article 9 of the Treaty Relating to Native Americans, in the Hand of Henry Clay

Autograph manuscript signed.  “The United States of America engage to put an end immediately after the Ratification of the present Treaty to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such Ratification, and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities. Provided always that such Tribes or Nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their Citizens, and Subjects upon the Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such Tribes or Nations, and shall so desist accordingly. And His Britannic Majesty engages on his part to put an end immediately after the Ratification of the present Treaty to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians with whom He may be at war at the time of such Ratification, and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities. Provided always that such Tribes or Nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against His Britannic Majesty and His Subjects upon the Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such Tribes or Nations, and shall so desist accordingly.”

 
4) The Final American Negotiating Notes for the Treaty of Ghent, Along With a Detailed Analysis and News of Its Imminent Signing

In the hand of negotiator Jonathan Russell, sent to the US Ambassador to France, William H. Crawford, who was central to US strategy on the Continent and the main figure in the US diplomatic corps in Europe

“We shall receive the British ministers at a conference this day to fill up the blanks, particularly those with respect to the limitation of capture at sea, and to arrange some of the formalities of the treaty.  This done, and fair copies of the treaty drawn up, it will be signed. You have now before you the results of our labors. I will make no other comment than that I believe we have done the best, or nearly the best, which was practicable in existing conditions.”

Autograph letter signed, by negotiator Jonathan Russell, 8 long pages, Ghent, December 23, 1814, to Crawford. “In noticing the diversity of opinion which may occasionally occur in particular points between the members of the mission to which I belong, and which undoubtedly arises from the difference of the impression which the same circumstances make on different men, however sincerely united in the pursuit of the same ultimate object, I by no means set up for infallibility or am overconfident that the course of which I may be the advocate is the best. I am still further from intending to insinuate any reproach against the patriotism or integrity or intelligence of my colleagues because I happen to be so unfortunate as not to accord with them in my view of all the subjects, which, in the course of the negotiation are presented for discussion. My only object in communicating to you these things is to make you better acquainted with the character of our proceedings, to show you that both sides of a question have been examined, and the profit of your information and advice, if to be obtained in season to influence the final decision.  There are so many agents informing the opinions and producing the convictions of a man besides his reason… The influence of habit and of education is also unsafe and the wisest and best of men may in vain believe themselves free from the prejudices it necessarily engenders. A long cooperation with a party or a sect imbues the very soul with their colors and whatever purity we may affect or sincerely endeavor to attain we still give the same tinge to everything which we touch.  A professional education is likewise apt to impose fetters on the mind and to give a mechanical or artificial character even to our reasoning.  Aware of these and other frailties of human nature, if I am disposed perhaps to distrust too much the opinions of others I am taught a salutary diffidence in my own.  When however I encounter a man in whose heart all the nobler passions have found their home, who's head is unobscured by the fogs of false education, who's great object is the welfare of his country and pursues this object with an instinctive good sense that never deceives, I listen to him with unsuspecting confidence…”

“I will now endeavor to make you amends by stating the sober details of business, which I'm sure Will be more interesting to you. After my last letter to you of the second we heard nothing from the British ministers until the ninth when Mr. Baker their secretary called on us to ask a conference for the next day.  At this conference they informed us that their amendment to the first article could not be entirely withdrawn but they were willing so to modify it…. They gave us also to understand that all our propositions as a substitute for their additional clause to the eighth article were inadmissible on their part, however they presented one (marked A) which you will find enclosed….”

“We shall receive the British ministers at a conference this day to fill up the blanks, particularly those with respect to the limitation of capture at sea, and to arrange some of the formalities of the treaty.  This done, and fair copies of the treaty drawn up, it will be signed.  You have now before you the results of our labors. I will make no other comment than that I believe we have done the best, or nearly the best, which was practicable in existing conditions.”

 
5) Included are the final negotiating notes for the treaty provisions:

The four large pages of intensive notations illustrate the fundamental basis of the peace: stop the war with few preconditions, and leave the other issues between the two nations to further negotiations in peacetime in the future. Here are a few excerpts: The British wanted provisions with specificity, such as, “His Britannic Majesty agrees to enter into negotiations with the United States of America respecting the terms, conditions, and regulations under which the inhabitants of the United States take fish on certain parts of the coast of Newfoundland and other of his…dominions in North America…The United States of America agrees to enter into negotiations with His Britannic Majesty respecting the terms, conditions, and regulations under which the navigation of the river Mississippi…shall remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain”. The Americans felt these were unnecessary, and they were not included in the final treaty; moreover, they would “not accede” to introducing navigation of the Mississippi at all. “Yet to an agreement couched in general terms, so as to embrace all the subjects of difference not yet adjusted…the undersigned are ready to agree.”

The parties agreed “to the mutual restoration of territory taken by either party from the other during the war”, with the exception of a dispute in Maine (that would not be resolved for years), provided that “the claim of the United States shall not thereby in any manner be affected.” The Americans expressed concurrence with the British demand, and would “promote the abolition of the slave trade”.

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